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1 
2 
3 Abstract 
4 
5 This  article  sheds  new  light  on  the  pharmaceutical  industry’s  response  to  the  PR 
6 
7 
crisis  generated   by   the  global  civil  society  campaign  for  access  to       HIV/AIDS 
8 
9 
10 medicines since the early 2000s - one of the most contentious policy areas of global 
11 
12 trade  and  health  governance.  Drawing  on  interviews  with  industry  insiders,      the 
13 
14 article explores the industry’s communicative agency in both the media sphere and 
15 
16 key sites of power, with a focus on the EU policy sphere. The analysis shows that the 
17 
18 
industry has focused primarily on maintaining access to policy-makers    and sustaining 
20 
21 elite consensus around the existing global intellectual property rights regime through 
22 
23 political communication activities that largely  bypass mediated public  arenas –    from 
24 
25 strategically  promoting its CSR  programmes,  mobilising  third-party  endorsement, to 
26 
27 
direct lobbying. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings 
28 
29 
30 for  critical  investigations  of  the  interplay  between  media  and  political  power     in 
31 
32 relation to global economic  governance. 
33 
34 
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36 Keywords:    communicative    agency,    pharmaceutical    industry,    public  relations, 
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38 
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1 
2 
3 Introduction 
4 
5 For almost two decades, access to essential medicines in the Global South has been 
6 
7 
one  of the  most contentious issues in international trade and development politics.    At 
8 
9 
10 the  turn  of  the  millennium,  the  access  to  medicines  (A2M)  transnational advocacy 
11 
12 network played a critical role in exposing how patent rules enshrined in the World 
13 
14 Trade   Organisation   (WTO)   Trade-Related   Intellectual   Property   Rights   (TRIPS) 
15 
16 Agreement  and  ‘Big  Pharma’  pricing  policies  are  implicated  in  the  denial  of life- 
17 
18 
saving treatment to millions of people living with HIV/AIDS (Smith & Siplon, 2006; 
20 
21 Timmermann  &  van  den  Belt,  2013).  When,  in  January  2014,  the  South   African 
22 
23 Health  Minister  accused  the  pharmaceutical  industry  of  an  attempt  at  ‘genocide’ - 
24 
25 following  leaked  emails  detailing  its  plan  to  undermine  the  government’s     patent 
26 
27 
legislation reform (de Wet, 2014) - it was a matter of déjà vu for many observers, 
28 
29 
30 recalling a  seminal  moment  in the  global  struggle  for  AIDS treatment more  than   a 
31 
32 decade earlier. 
33 
34 In 1998, a group of 39 pharmaceutical corporations filed a lawsuit against the 
35 
36 South African government for its alleged violation of WTO TRIPS rules. The lawsuit, 
37 
38 
in a  country that was facing the  world’s biggest HIV/AIDS crisis,  triggered a     global 
40 
41 campaign  led  by  international  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs),     including 
42 
43 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),  Oxfam,  Health Action  International (HAI),     South 
44 
45 Africa’s  grassroots  Treatment  Action  Campaign  (TAC),  in  coalition  with numerous 
46 
47 
AIDS  activist  groups  and  public  health  advocates.  With   protests,   petitions,     and 
48 
49 
50 negative  publicity around the  world,  the  industry was  ultimately forced to drop     the 
51 
52 case  in April  2001 and settle  out of court.  ‘South Africa’,  wrote  the Financial Times 
53 
54 (FT)  (19  April  2001)  at  the  time,  ‘is  to  the  global  pharmaceutical  industry   what 
55 
56 Vietnam was to the US military. Nothing will be quite the same again’, though it 
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1 
2 
3 tempered the hyperbole with a revealing caveat: ‘That at least is the view of Oxfam’. 
4 
5 The   South   African  court   case   was   ‘a   key   event   delegitimising pharmaceutical 
6 
7 
corporations’ (Morin,  2011: 233) and,  together with subsequent  similar   controversies 
8 
9 
10 in Brazil, Thailand, Kenya, and at the WTO, ‘presented a genuine public relations 
11 
12 disaster for the    pharmaceutical companies’ (Sell, 2003: 157) which continues to haunt 
13 
14 the industry to this day. 
15 
16 The  aim  of  this article  is to  shed new light  on  the industry’s  response  to the 
17 
18 
fallout   from   the   A2M   campaign   since   the   early   2000s,   drawing   primarily on 
20 
21 interviews with industry insiders and PR practitioners.  More specifically,  it   examines 
22 
23 the  main  political  communication  strategies  deployed  in  response  to  the     ensuing 
24 
25 legitimacy  crisis  of  the  TRIPS  regime,  focusing  on both  the  industry’s engagement 
26 
27 
with  the  news  media  as  well  as  a  number  of  less  visible,  though  arguably   more 
28 
29 
30 effectual, promotional activities. The findings indicate that the industry has primarily 
31 
32 used communicative channels that bypass the ‘circuit of mass communication’    (Miller 
33 
34 et  al.,  1998),  targeting key policy elites through the  strategic  promotion of  corporate 
35 
36 social   responsibility   (CSR)   schemes,   enlisting   third-party   support,   and     direct 
37 
38 
lobbying,  with  the  aim  of  securing elite consensus around  TRIPS.  These findings,  I 
40 
41 argue  by way of conclusion, challenge  the  persistent ‘media-centrism’     (Schlesinger, 
42 
43 1990)  characteristic  of  much  contemporary  theorisation  about  communication   and 
44 
45 power. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 Media in the global A2M  campaign 
51 
52 The  relationship  between  poor  countries’  access  to  HIV/AIDS  and  other   essential 
53 
54 medicines   and   TRIPS   has   generated   a   large   body   of   literature   from  various 
55 
56 disciplinary  perspectives  (Matthews,  2012;  Morin,   2011;   Olesen,   2006;   Roemer- 
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1 
2 
3 Mahler, 2013; Sell, 2003, 2011; Sell & Prakhash, 2004; Smith & Siplon, 2006), a 
4 
5 comprehensive review of which is far beyond the scope of this article. Instead, the 
6 
7 
point  to  emphasise  is that  what  clearly emerges from  these  studies  is  that  the news 
8 
9 
10 media  became  an  important  arena  in  which  the  political  struggle  over  TRIPS and 
11 
12 AIDS  treatment  access  unfolded  at  the  turn  of  the  millennium.   Through     highly 
13 
14 effective  campaigning  and  ‘information  politics’,  the  A2M  ‘transnational  advocacy 
15 
16 network’ (Keck  &  Sikkink,  2007) was able  to  re-frame  TRIPS from  an opaque trade 
17 
18 
policy matter to a highly politically charged public health (that is, life or death) issue 
20 
21 in both media and policy discourse (Sell & Prakash, 2004). Furthermore, it did so in 
22 
23 morally  compelling  terms,  scripting  a  media-savvy  narrative  of  ‘a  brave  band    of 
24 
25 activists   coming  together  for   a   pitched   struggle   against  a   callous,  profit-driven 
26 
27 
pharmaceutical industry being aided by a  complicit government  in  the  quest  to   keep 
28 
29 
30 affordable  medications  out  of  the  hands  of  dying  people’  (Smith  &  Siplon,  2006: 
31 
32 160). 
33 
34 As with other transnational civil society campaigns (Cottle & Lester, 2011), 
35 
36 the  A2M  network’s  ability  to  generate  media  visibility  is  widely  seen  as  ‘key   to 
37 
38 
influencing  pharmaceutical  company  behaviour’  (Trullen  &  Stevenson,  2006:  205) 
40 
41 and challenging the very legitimacy of the TRIPS regime, the global expansion of 
42 
43 which has been a cornerstone of US and European trade agendas since the mid-1980s 
44 
45 (Pugatch, 2004). Or, more precisely, ‘[l]egitimacy was not a major issue until after    the 
46 
47 
[WTO] agreement was signed’ in 1994 and not until AIDS activists radically altered 
48 
49 
50 the  political  salience  of  TRIPS  in  the  late  1990s  (Sell,   2003:  183).  The        latter 
51 
52 effectively drew the  struggle  over TRIPS from the  confines of  elite     communicative 
53 
54 spaces at the WTO, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other policy fora into 
55 
56 the mediated public arena such that ‘for the first time, mass publics in the West learnt 
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1 
2 
3 that    their    governments   had…participated    in   trade    negotiations    that  globally 
4 
5 strengthened  patent  monopolies’  (Drahos  and  Braithwaite,  2002:  8).  Subjected  to a 
6 
7 
transnationally constituted ‘court  of  public  opinion’ (Olesen,  2006),  the  industry and 
8 
9 
10 western   governments   were   duly   named   and   shamed,   and   compelled   to  make 
11 
12 important, if limited, concessions with regard to poor countries’ TRIPS obligations at 
13 
14 the 2001 WTO Ministerial conference in  Doha.
1
 
15 
16 While intuitively sound, most claims about the role of the media in the global 
17 
18 
struggle for access to medicines are either made in passing or based only on anecdotal 
20 
21 evidence.  One  reason  for  this  is  that  media  and  communication  scholars  have 
22 
23 contributed little  to the voluminous literature on the  global politics of    TRIPS,  access 
24 
25 to medicines,  or HIV/AIDS more  broadly in  recent years  (Swain,  2005).
2     
Secondly, 
26 
27 
most  studies  approach  the  matter  from  the  normative  perspective  of  civil  society, 
28 
29 
30 assessing the  relative  success of  the  A2M  campaign in  reforming the  TRIPS regime 
31 
32 and   expanding   treatment   access.   While   not   problematic   per   se,   arguably, one 
33 
34 consequence  of  this  positionality  is  that  relatively  little  is  known  about  how    the 
35 
36 campaign   has   been   perceived   within   the   industry   or   the   rationales   behind its 
37 
38 
communications  response. 
40 
41 Thirdly, claims about the industry’s framing strategies in particular tend to be 
42 
43 derived   largely   from   media   content,   as   in   Owen’s   (2013)   otherwise insightful 
44 
45 discourse analysis of UK, US, and South African press coverage of the contestation 
46 
47 
between civil society, ‘Big Pharma’, and governments over the legitimacy of using 
48 
49 
50 generic  medicines in addressing the  AIDS treatment gap in poor countries.    Similarly, 
51 
52 Trullen  and  Stevenson  (2006)  base  their  analysis  of  seven  major     pharmaceutical 
53 
54 companies’  reaction  to the  A2M campaign  solely on  press coverage  and NGO  press 
55 
56 releases,  an approach  that  carries  important  methodological  limitations (see  below). 
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1 
2 
3 Furthermore,   Owen’s   analysis   is   restricted   to   the   period   1997-2003,   a  highly 
4 
5 mediatised moment of the campaign, which, as the author acknowledges, represents 
6 
7 
‘an anomaly’ in terms of the media’s historical treatment of the issue (2013:   272). 
8 
9 
10 Indeed, as Morin argues in his sophisticated analysis of the ‘life-cycle’ of the 
11 
12 A2M  controversy,  there is  a tendency to  treat the  ‘death of issues…as an     academic 
13 
14 afterthought’  (2011:  230).  Morin’s  critique  is  directed  at  the  field  of  international 
15 
16 public   policy   studies   but   it   also   applies   to   the   study   of   media   and political 
17 
18 
communication which often tends to abandon issues once    their mass-mediated life has 
20 
21 expired.  Though  it  has  largely  dropped  off  the  media  radar  since  the    mid-2000s 
22 
23 (Morin, 2011), TRIPS remains a highly divisive issue in international policy fora such 
24 
25 as  the WTO  and WHO (Koivusalo,  2010; Sell, 2011).  Naturally,  all relevant    policy 
26 
27 
actors   –   public   health   NGOs,   industry   associations,   governments,  international 
28 
29 
30 organisations – continue to engage in a range of promotional activities to shape policy 
31 
32 discourse and outcomes at  various levels of  global health and  trade  governance.   And 
33 
34 while  these  may  not  target  mainstream  news  media,  that,  however,  does  not mean 
35 
36 they  do  not  exist  or  render  them  irrelevant  for  the  study  of  ‘strategic       political 
37 
38 
communication’ (Aronczyk,  2015: 2009). 
40 
41 Subsequently, it is important to avoid the ‘bias of media studies towards mass 
42 
43 communication’  whereby  ‘the  study  of  elite  communications  networks  have    been 
44 
45 badly neglected’  (Parsons,  1989:  3).  Parsons  is  referring specifically to  news  media 
46 
47 
consumed  by  political  and   economic   elites  such   as   the   FT  but  the   observation 
48 
49 
50 generalises to other,  less visible, forms of  inter-elite communication. Here  it may    be 
51 
52 useful to introduce the conceptual distinction commonly made in literature on interest 
53 
54 groups  between  ‘inside’  and  ‘outside’  lobbying  (Tresch  &  Fischer,  2015).    Inside 
55 
56 lobbying,   or  what   Beyers   (2004:   213)  calls   ‘access’  strategies,   refers   to direct 
  
(2015: 450) argue that under conditions of neoliberalism the significance of ‘private 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 and citizens becomes visible to a broader audience’ through the mass media   (ibid.). 
13 
14 This    distinction    is    a    particularly    useful    heuristic   device    for critical 
15 
16 investigations  of  corporate  PR  practices.  As  Davis’ ethnographic  studies  of  City of 
17 
18 
London  elites  have  shown,  these  are  ‘not  particularly  focused  on  the  “masses”  or 
20 
21 mainstream news at  all’ (2002:  57).  In fact,  considerable efforts are  expended  by PR 
22 
23 practitioners to  keep clients and  issues outside  the  media  spotlight  (see also    Davis, 
24 
25 2007).  Consequently, Freedman  urges communication scholars  to pay  more  attention 
26 
27 
to the ‘“hidden channels” - for example, the lobbying activities - in which influence is 
28 
29 
30 applied  and  interests  promoted’  (2010:  355-356;  Miller,  2010),  while  Philo  et   al. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 grown. This suggests that an inordinate empirical focus on the mediated public sphere 
37 
38 
may be to miss the locus of the pharmaceutical industry’s promotional efforts. Indeed, 
40 
41 a  Canadian  study  (Esmail  et  al.,  2010)  found  that  civil  society  was  the ‘dominant 
42 
43 voice’  in  the  national  press  during  a  high-profile  legislative  debate  over  Canada’s 
44 
45 implementation of  WTO rules on  the  use  of  compulsory licensing for the  export    of 
46 
47 
medicines  to  developing  countries.  However,  given  the  final  policy  outcome,    the 
48 
49 
50 authors suggest that the ‘lack of the brand industry’s presence in the media is by no 
51 
52 means an indicator of their interest in the legislation’ but rather that it ‘did not have to 
53 
54 rely on  the  news  media to  have  its  views incorporated  into  the  legislative  process’ 
55 
56 (ibid: 13). 
interaction with policy-makers in ‘venues where  political bargaining takes     place’ 
which are ‘invisible or only partially visible to a large audience’. Outside lobbying, or 
‘voice’ strategies, are directed at wider publics and ‘tak[e] place in various public 
spheres, an arena where the communication among societal interests, policy-makers 
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1 
2 
3 To   what  extent,   then,  is  the  capacity  to   short-circuit  the   public     sphere 
4 
5 characteristic of the industry’s response  to the  A2M  crisis more  generally? And  what 
6 
7 
are   some   of   the   alternative   communicative   channels  and   promotional activities 
8 
9 
10 through  which  the  industry  has  sought  to  influence policy-making processes? These 
11 
12 questions that underpin this study seek to problematise the notion that the mass media 
13 
14 constitute   the   primary   arena   for   political   struggles,   the   ‘space   where    power 
15 
16 relationships are decided between competing political and social actors’, as Castells 
17 
18 
(2009: 194) argues in his influential account. From this media-centric perspective,    one 
20 
21 would  expect  pharmaceutical  companies  to  throw  their  full  weight  behind  a media 
22 
23 campaign  to  counter  the  messages  and  frames  circulated  by  the  A2M      advocacy 
24 
25 network.  Yet,  the  findings  presented  below  suggest  that  the  industry  has,  in  fact, 
26 
27 
invested  relatively few  resources  in  outside  lobbying and although  it  has repeatedly 
28 
29 
30 lost the ‘media battle’ in relation to access to medicines, its capacity to shape policy 
31 
32 through  various access  strategies and inter-elite  channels of  communication has    not 
33 
34 significantly diminished. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Methods 
42 
43 The   following  analysis   draws   on   51   semi-structured  interviews   that   took place 
44 
45 between  2010-12  with  key  policy  actors  involved  in  the  struggle  over  TRIPS and 
46 
47 
access  to  medicines.  The  core  focus  is  on  the  empirical  material  generated    from 
48 
49 
50 interviews  with  11  industry insiders,  including  major pharmaceutical companies  and 
51 
52 the  industry’s  main  lobbying  organisations  in  Brussels  and  Geneva  -  the European 
53 
54 Federation    of    Pharmaceutical    Industries    and    Associations    (EFPIA)    and the 
55 
56 International  Federation of  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers and  Associations (IFPMA) 
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1 
2 
3 -  but  all  interviews  have  helped to  contextualise  and  narrate  the  findings presented 
4 
5 below.  Interviewees  were  identified  through  targeted and  snowball  sampling. Given 
6 
7 
the  sensitivity of  the  issue,  many respondents requested anonymity and most    quotes 
8 
9 
10 therefore remain unattributed (see Appendix A for partial list of   interviewees). 
11 
12 Elite  interviewing  poses  a  number  of  methodological  challenges  (Richards, 
13 
14 1996),   including  gaining  access  and   the   ‘risk’   of   merely   ‘analysing  impression 
15 
16 management  claims’  of  industry  lobbyists  (2006:  183).  Nonetheless,  it  is  often the 
17 
18 
only route to ‘provide insights into…the activities that take place out of the public or 
20 
21 media  gaze,  behind closed doors’ (Lilleker,  2003: 208),  to investigate policy     elites’ 
22 
23 ‘perceptions,  beliefs  and  ideologies’  (Richards,  1996:  199),  and  thereby     generate 
24 
25 findings   that   are   impossible   to   infer   from   ‘text-only’   communication  research 
26 
27 
methods (Philo, 2007). 
28 
29 
30 Elite interviewing is at the  core  of Davis’ (2007) ‘inverted political   economy’ 
31 
32 model – an analytical framework which shifts the empirical focus from elite-mass to 
33 
34 inter-elite modes of political communication at specific ‘sites of power’. Many of the 
35 
36 interviewees in this study are located in Brussels - a key site of power given the EU’s 
37 
38 
position as the  world’s biggest trade bloc and development aid     donor.  Consequently, 
40 
41 the  institutional  complex  in  Brussels  attracts  intensive  lobbying  from  all    relevant 
42 
43 policy actors operating at the intersection of global health and trade.    The Euroquartier 
44 
45 can   be   productively   conceptualised   as   a   transnational   ‘communicative     space’ 
46 
47 
(Schlesinger, 1999; Corcoran & Fahy, 2009), composed of overlapping, more or less 
48 
49 
50 insular elite  networks  and channels of communication,  and inhabited by a     relatively 
51 
52 small range of ‘strong publics’ (Fraser, 1997:  90). 
53 
54 Rather   than   reconstructing   or   measuring   the   policy   influence   of      the 
55 
56 pharmaceutical lobby as such,  the aim  was,  first,  to  probe how insiders perceive    the 
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1 
2 
3 industry’s  relationship with the media  in relation to the  A2M campaign, and,   second, 
4 
5 to identify the industry’s key messages, the audiences at whom these are targeted, and 
6 
7 
via  what  communicative  channels.  In  other  words,  the   focus  was  the     industry’s 
8 
9 
10 ‘communicative   agency’,   defined  by  Miller  and  Harkins  as   attempts  by   interest 
11 
12 groups to ‘dominate the information environment’ in multiple arenas of policy debate 
13 
14 ‘so they can significantly affect    decision making’ but which do not necessarily seek to 
15 
16 influence mass public opinion or the media (2010:   566). 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Rupturing the bounds of elite  consensus 
22 
23 The   industry’s   legal   challenge   to   South   Africa’s   1997   Medicines   Act initially 
24 
25 gathered  high-level  political  support  in  the  US  and Europe  (Drahos  & Braithwaite, 
26 
27 
2002: 7). SmithKline Beechham’s3  former chief lobbyist in Brussels recalls that this 
28 
29 
30 was  ‘standard  operating  procedures  under  [then  EU  Trade  Commissioner]      Leon 
31 
32 Brittain, which was to defend the commercial interests of big European and American 
33 
34 drug companies’. By mid-1999,  the  political climate began  to change as MSF   started 
35 
36 to push the public health dimension of TRIPS onto the agenda of Pascal Lamy, the 
37 
38 
new Trade  Commissioner.  Furthermore,  the  news media were beginning to  pick    up 
40 
41 the story too (Owen, 2013), as the AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa had reached 
42 
43 truly harrowing proportions, with millions dying for lack of affordable    treatment. 
44 
45 More than a decade on, the court case is still perceived by industry insiders as 
46 
47 
an unprecedented PR disaster. One interviewee put it   thus: 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 Thirty-nine pharma companies versus Nelson Mandela…From PR terms this 
53 
54 is  a  complete  gift…If anyone  with an ounce  of political intelligence  had seen 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 the  front  page  of  this court  case,  they would’ve  immediately said:  what  the 
4 
5 fuck is this? You do not sue Nelson  Mandela!
4
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 Catapulted into the world’s news headlines, Big Pharma was slipping towards   ‘pariah’ 
11 
12 status,   with   GSK,   for  example,   re-branded   by   AIDS  activists  as  ‘Global Serial 
13 
14 Killer’.
5  
Business  press  commentators  urged companies  to  alter  their  conduct  in the 
15 
16 Global South and adopt the newly fashionable concept of CSR because they ‘will find 
17 
18 
that,  in the  long run,  they are  not going to do themselves good by being complicit    in 
20 
21 what is beyond doubt another holocaust, even if not one caused by murderous intent’ 
22 
23 (FT, 12 March 2001) – a damning depiction of the industry in a newspaper closely 
24 
25 monitored  by policy-makers, corporate  elites, and investors. The chief concern of    the 
26 
27 
latter  was  that  demands  for  cheaper  medicines  and  weaker  patent  rules would spill 
28 
29 
30 over  to markets in the  Global  North and  endanger ‘the  industry's  monopoly status   - 
31 
32 the foundation of its fabulous wealth’ (FT, 17 February   2001). 
33 
34 The   industry   ‘got   its   fingers   burnt’   and,   with   its   ‘reputation   severely 
35 
36 damaged’, it even became ostracised from its traditional corporate allies. According    to 
37 
38 
a report in the European Voice (27 September  2001): 
40 
41 
42 
43 music  industry  representatives  turned  down  suggestions  of  a  joint campaign 
44 
45 when approached by…EFPIA at a recent Geneva meeting. ‘We don't want to 
46 
47 
work  with  them,  with  all  the  bad  press  they've  been  getting…South Africa 
48 
49 
50 shouldn’t have happened to start  with.’ 
51 
52 
53 
54 Directed squarely at the industry’s monopoly pricing privileges - the ‘life-blood of   our 
55 
56 business  model’  -  the  A2M  campaign  was  generating  ‘a   lot  of  paranoia’  and    ‘a 
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1 
2 
3 domino  mindset’  in   corporate  boardrooms,   one   interviewee   noted.   Furthermore, 
4 
5 according to an EFPIA  lobbyist,  the  industry’s  intransigence  was ‘clearly…casting a 
6 
7 
shadow’ on its relations with the European Commission and the European    Parliament. 
8 
9 
10 At the WTO, TRIPS had become one of the most contentious North-South issues in 
11 
12 the fledgling new round of trade talks and the EU, under Lamy’s leadership, began to 
13 
14 endorse  developing countries’  right  to  use  legal  flexibilities contained  in the TRIPS 
15 
16 agreement  -  compulsory  licensing and  parallel  importation -  to  tackle  public health 
17 
18 
crises such as HIV/AIDS (Hannah,  2011). Amplified by  widespread media    publicity, 
20 
21 the   A2M   campaign   thus   succeeded   in   (temporarily)   rupturing   elite   consensus 
22 
23 regarding the  existing TRIPS  regime.  ‘Leading to the  Doha  ministerial  declaration of 
24 
25 2001,’ one industry interviewee  noted, 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 the  media  played  a  significant  role  in  highlighting access  to  medicines where 
31 
32 intellectual property was perceived as one of the main  problems...It almost    went 
33 
34 from one  extreme  to the other…from pure ambivalence  to IP  being     front  and 
35 
36 centre. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 The media front: A lost  battle? 
42 
43 As the political crisis around access to AIDS medicines escalated following the South 
44 
45 African court  case,  company executives  found  themselves  in the  unusual  position of 
46 
47 
having to repeatedly defend their position on the front of pages of the world’s press. 
48 
49 
50 GSK’s  CEO  Jean  Paul  Garnier  recalled  ‘it  was  hard  to  avoid  seeing  your    name 
51 
52 plastered  all  over  the  papers’  and  insisted  that  ‘we  should  have  been  even    more 
53 
54 aggressive  before  the events in educating the media’ (FT, 22  July 2005). So how    did 
55 
56 the industry engage with the news  media? 
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1 
2 
3 The  central aim of  the industry’s  media  strategy  has  been  to direct  attention 
4 
5 away  from  TRIPS  and  dilute  the  question  of  pricing  and  patents  by   emphasising 
6 
7 
Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment. As EFPIA’s former communications    director 
8 
9 
10 explained: 
11 
12 
13 
14 My job was…to explain…that it’s not simply a matter of…parachuting drugs 
15 
16 in  Mozambique  or Burkina  Faso because  there are  no airports,  there  are   no 
17 
18 
roads, there is no water, there is no hospital, there is no doctor, there is no 
20 
21 nurse, there is nothing...When they [journalists] start to realise that…they start 
22 
23 to understand: ‘Yes, OK, you’re not always the  villains.’ 
24 
25 
26 
27 
In particular, the transnational elite press (e.g. FT,  The  Economist,  European     Voice) 
28 
29 
30 and   leading   agenda-setting   newspapers   (e.g.  Le   Monde,   Frankfurter Allgemeine 
31 
32 Zeitung)  were  identified  by  all  interviewees  as  important  communicative platforms 
33 
34 through which the industry (and rival interest groups) have sought to shape the policy 
35 
36 debate.  Pfizer,  for  example,  regularly bought  advertisement space  in The  Economist 
37 
38 
between 2000 and 2003. The Pfizer Forum featured several articles from various pro- 
40 
41 TRIPS academics, lawyers, and think-tanks such as the Fraser Institute repeating the 
42 
43 message  that ‘Poverty,  Not Patents,  is the  Problem in  Africa’ (Lippert, 2002).   Other 
44 
45 companies  like   Boehringer   Ingelheim   (BI)  have   organised   media   tours   for this 
46 
47 
purpose – ‘a very helpful tool [to convey] the complexities of medicines access. But’, 
48 
49 
50 BI’s  Head  of  Media  and  PR  notes,  there  are  obvious limits  to  this  approach: ‘you 
51 
52 cannot set up a travel agency and bring journalists to Africa twice per   year’. 
53 
54 The  pharmaceutical  industry  has  also  benefitted  from  close  institutional ties 
55 
56 with  Brussels-based  news  organisations.  The  EV,  for  instance,   organises     Health 
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1 
2 
3 Check  Briefings,  regular  seminars  sponsored  by  EFPIA  and  attended  by    relevant 
4 
5 policy   stakeholders.   Similarly,   The   Parliament   Magazine,   another   EU     affairs 
6 
7 
publication, organised  a lunch  debate in 2012  with  the  German  drugs    manufacturer 
8 
9 
10 Bayer  entitled  ‘Access  to  medicines:  are  patents  the  real  barrier?’
6    Moreover,   the 
11 
12 Brussels   media   sphere   is   characterised   by   intimate   journalist-source     relations 
13 
14 (Corcoran & Fahy, 2009) and a political economy that acts as a structural barrier to 
15 
16 investigative reporting. At times, this has even    led  to overt editorial intervention. One 
17 
18 
former European Voice correspondent recalls the ‘not so subtle’ editorial pressure put 
20 
21 on  reporters  to  be  more  ‘neutral’ and  ‘balanced’ in their coverage  of the  access    to 
22 
23 medicines  story,  following  threats  from  a  pharmaceutical  company  to  withdraw its 
24 
25 advertising.  In another incident,  a  lobbyist ‘called me  up  to  demand  that the    paper 
26 
27 
cover a new initiative of GSK. She even demanded that our story appear in the main 
28 
29 
30 news  section of  the  paper,  rather than on the business  pages’.  GSK’s  price reduction 
31 
32 of the HIV drug Combivir for developing countries was announced a few days ‘prior 
33 
34 to a  roundtable  meeting on access  to medicines hosted by European     Commissioners 
35 
36 Pascal  Lamy  and  Philippe  Busquin’,  addressed  by  Commission  president   Romano 
37 
38 
Prodi,  and attended by senior industry executives and  other high-profile    stakeholders 
40 
41 (GSK,  2003).  Crucially,  the  event  took  place  at  the  height  of  WTO    negotiations 
42 
43 regarding   developing   countries’   right   to   import   generic   medicines,   when A2M 
44 
45 campaigners  were  arguing  that  voluntary  discounts,   though  welcome,  are   not     a 
46 
47 
sustainable  solution  to the  lack  of  affordable  HIV/AIDS drugs (Oxfam  et al., 2002). 
48 
49 
50 The pressure paid off. The story appeared under the title ‘AIDS drug price slashed’ 
51 
52 (EV, 1 May 2003). These examples show how the industry has strategically mobilised 
53 
54 its  privileged  access  to  elite  news  publications  not  only  to  shape  the   information 
55 
56 environment  during  key  moments  of  the  A2M  policy  cycle  but,  more  routinely, to 
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1 
2 
3 maintain direct  access to EU policy-makers, blurring the  distinction  between   ‘inside’ 
4 
5 and ‘outside’ lobbying. 
6 
7 
However, all industry interviewees agreed that in relation to the A2M crisis 
8 
9 
10 companies have never invested significant resources in the latter, when conceived as 
11 
12 attempts  to  influence  policy-makers  ‘indirectly  through  the  mobilisation  of   public 
13 
14 opinion’ (Tresch & Fisher, 2015: 356). By and large, the industry’s media strategy has 
15 
16 been reactive; it has not sought ‘to fight this out in the media’,    which do not constitute 
17 
18 
the  main  communicative  channel  through  which  the  industry  has  sought  to   ‘shift 
20 
21 perceptions’,  be  it of mass publics  or policy stakeholders.  As  one company    director 
22 
23 put it: 
24 
25 
26 
27 
The  industry  has  never  tried  to  reach  out  to  the  media  on  this  issue  in   a 
28 
29 
30 significant   way.   Never.   At   best,   some   companies   may   have   had some 
31 
32 communication  activities  around  some  of  their  access  initiatives.  But     it’s 
33 
34 always been de minimis. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Partly  this  has  to  do  with  restrictions  on  direct-to-consumer  advertising  in Europe. 
40 
41 But,  in  line  with  Morin’s  findings  (2011),  a  more  significant  factor  is  the  widely 
42 
43 shared belief that access to medicines is ‘an agenda which you cannot win’ because, 
44 
45 ultimately,  ‘all  you  need to show is  a  picture  of a dying  baby and  you’ve  lost    the 
46 
47 
moral argument’. According to a former PR manager responsible for his company’s 
48 
49 
50 relations with A2M NGOs: 
51 
52 
53 
54 We   never   actively   sought   to   play   this   out   and   make   it   a         media 
55 
56 issue…Whoever the  opponent  is, let’s say it’s  Oxfam,  it’s very,  very easy for 
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1 
2 
3 them to make this very emotive, you know, big, rich evil company is keeping 
4 
5 medicines  away from  poor  people...  For  a  company to then…try  and explain 
6 
7 
their    position    using    technicality,    legality,    and    regulation…just makes 
8 
9 
10 companies sound like a capitalist  machine.
7
 
11 
12 
13 
14 The  lack  of  pro-active  media  engagement  is  further compounded  by  the perception 
15 
16 that the mainstream news media are populated by ‘activist huggers’ who ‘will take 
17 
18 
anything that is provided by global civil society as valid and true and unbiased’. In 
20 
21 fact,  virtually the entire media  sphere - the ‘populist’, ‘left-wing’, ‘mainstream    press’ 
22 
23 and  ‘tabloids’  –  is  deemed  a  ‘lost  battle’;  the  business  press  and        conservative 
24 
25 broadsheets are  the  only spectrum of  the  media  landscape  deemed worth   engaging. 
26 
27 
This is where ‘the argument gets through’ and, according to a senior IFPMA   director, 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 where they…realise that…businesses need to function, there are shareholders 
33 
34 that you need to keep happy…They always ask for our opinions and we get 
35 
36 more  input  into what  they might  say,  whereas  a Guardian  article  will quote 
37 
38 
MSF or Oxfam but perhaps won’t even attempt to get a quote from   industry. 
40 
41 
42 
43 Formally,  this  perception  is  not  entirely  unfounded.  In  a  reversal  of   conventional 
44 
45 media-source   relations  marked   by  journalists’  proximity   to   power   (Berry, 2013; 
46 
47 
Herman & Chomsky, 1994), existing studies show that more space    is accorded to civil 
48 
49 
50 society voices in coverage of A2M controversies (Esmail et al. 2010; Owen, 2013). 
51 
52 Across much of  the  media  landscape,  TRIPS proponents  have  thus found themselves 
53 
54 reacting to  a simple, even  simplistic, yet  powerful ‘David  versus Goliath’    (Boseley, 
55 
56 personal communication) narrative skilfully promoted by the A2M advocacy    network. 
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1 
2 
3 That said, no firm conclusions should be drawn from this about the efficacy of the 
4 
5 industry’s  communication  strategy  as  far  as  policy  outcomes  are  concerned  for, as 
6 
7 
Davis  stresses,  it is important not to  conflate  the ‘“public  sphere”  with the     “policy 
8 
9 
10 sphere”’ (2007: 99). Instead, we need to move beyond the industry’s media response 
11 
12 and  explore  other  facets  of  its  communicative  agency.  One  such  area  is  corporate 
13 
14 social responsibility. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
CSR: Shifting elite perceptions, maintaining   access 
20 
21 Since  the early 2000s, all HIV drugs manufacturers have established extensive    access 
22 
23 programmes  in  the  field  of  HIV/AIDS  (and  other  diseases  that  mainly  afflict   the 
24 
25 Global   South).8     These   consist   of   donation   programmes,   tiered   pricing  models, 
26 
27 
voluntary   licensing   schemes,   patent   waivers,   and   public-private   research     and 
28 
29 
30 development    partnerships,    covering    varying    combinations    of    African,   least- 
31 
32 developed,  and  middle-income  countries.  All  major  pharmaceutical  companies   are 
33 
34 also members of CSR initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the Global Business 
35 
36 Coalition on HIV/AIDS, or the Access to Medicine  Index.9 
37 
38 
The  first  major  CSR  programme  focusing  on  HIV/AIDS  treatment  was the 
40 
41 Accelerating  Access  Initiative  (AAI).  Launched  in  May  2000  by  six  companies   - 
42 
43 Abbott,   BI,   Bristol-Myers  Squibb,   GSK,   Hoffmann-La  Roche,  and  Merck   -   in 
44 
45 partnership  with  the  UN,  it  aimed  to  improve  access  to  HIV  drugs  in  developing 
46 
47 
countries   through   voluntary   price   cuts.   As   revealed   by   a   Washington      Post 
48 
49 
50 investigation,  AAI  was  a  product  of  months  of  secretive  lobbying  by      corporate 
51 
52 executives   at   UNAIDS   and   the   WHO,   the   AAI’s   intergovernmental   sponsors 
53 
54 (Gellman,    2000).    Shortly    after    the    AAI    was    launched,    Glaxo’s Chairman 
55 
56 acknowledged  during  a  private  lunch  with  then  UK  Secretary  for        International 
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1 
2 
3 Development  that  ‘little  of  practical  value  would  emerge   from  the      UN-industry 
4 
5 announcement’10.  Indeed,  by early 2002  AAI  was providing treatment to  only a   few 
6 
7 
thousand patients and was denounced by activists as little more than an elaborate PR 
8 
9 
10 scheme  to deflect attention from  the  structural problem of  TRIPS (ACT  UP,    2002). 
11 
12 But the initiative  had served  its purpose of  giving the industry a     much-needed break 
13 
14 from increasing flak. On its front page, the Guardian (12 May 2000) described it as 
15 
16 the  ‘first  glimmers  of  hope for  a solution  to the Aids  epidemic  ravaging the poorest 
17 
18 
countries  in  Africa’,  while  BBC  Evening  News  (11  May   2000)  hailed  it  as      ‘a 
20 
21 revolution in the worldwide treatment of HIV/AIDS [which] could transform the lives 
22 
23 of literally millions of people’. On one level then, the AAI was a    carefully orchestrated 
24 
25 PR coup. But that is only part of the  story. 
26 
27 
Debates about whether CSR constitutes mere ‘spin’ or a genuine shift   towards 
28 
29 
30 a more ethical, socially responsible form of capitalism therefore largely miss the point 
31 
32 (Givel,  2013:  173).  At  the  level  of public  relations  -  image,  branding,  reputation - 
33 
34 CSR  is,  as  the  CEO  of  Burson-Marsteller  in  Brussels,  one  of  the  world’s leading 
35 
36 public   affairs   agencies,   readily   acknowledged,   ‘greenwash   and   always   will be 
37 
38 
greenwash’.  Nonetheless,  when  lobbying  is  viewed  as ‘essentially  a communication 
40 
41 process’   where   ‘the   task   of   the   lobbyist   to   figure   out   how   he   can    handle 
42 
43 communications   most   effectively   in   order   to   get   through   to   decision  makers’ 
44 
45 (Milbrath, 1960: 35), then CSR emerges as an important tool in companies’ lobbying 
46 
47 
arsenal. As the case of the tobacco industry attests, a key function of CSR is precisely 
48 
49 
50 to help ‘secure  access to policymakers and,  thereby,  increase  the  company's  chances 
51 
52 of  influencing  policy  decisions…even  in  ostensibly  unreceptive  political   contexts’ 
53 
54 (Fooks et al., 2011: 1). As one insider put it, without CSR, pharmaceutical companies 
55 
56 ‘wouldn’t have…many places to hide’ and ‘the very fact that [company X] could say: 
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1 
2 
3 “Hey,  hang on a  minute,  look at all  the  things that we  do for people  in    developing 
4 
5 countries”’ has proved instrumental in rebutting critics and normalising relations with 
6 
7 
policy-makers. Sklair and Miller therefore argue that ‘[w]hile it is correct to see CSR 
8 
9 
10 as a matter of corporate spin and image and brand management, it is also clear that it 
11 
12 performs a valuable service in managing government and policy debate (as opposed   to 
13 
14 popular debate and public opinion)’ (2010:  487). 
15 
16 Even  if  industry  practices  fall  far  short  of   their  public  commitments      to 
17 
18 
facilitating  access  to  medicines  to  the  global  poor (Givel,  2013),  CSR programmes 
20 
21 exist  in  a  very  real  sense.  Firstly,  they  are  not  mere   spin  conjured  up  by       PR 
22 
23 departments – ‘we are not just doing it for our reputation, it is not just greenwashing’ 
24 
25 - and have evidently benefited hundreds of thousands of patients in the Global South. 
26 
27 
Secondly,  and  more  importantly  in  the  context  of  this   discussion,  they  form     an 
28 
29 
30 integral,  material component  of the  industry’s communicative agency since the  South 
31 
32 African  fiasco.  What  is  more,  it  is  understood  as  such   by  industry  leaders      and 
33 
34 investors.  As  the  CEO  of  Abbott  Laboratories,  a  company  repeatedly  targeted   by 
35 
36 AIDS activists, explained in a moment of  candour: 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Why spend money on corporate citizenship? Frankly, because it is required. If 
42 
43 I   don’t   provide   our   products   in   Africa,   governments   will   license   our 
44 
45 intellectual property to others who can.  Governments will intervene.  Make   no 
46 
47 
mistake, they will do that. (FT, 14 July  2004) 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 Similarly,  when  questioned  by  a  shareholder  about  Pfizer’s  fluconazole
11   
donation 
53 
54 programme in South Africa - initiated after MSF and TAC protested against Pfizer’s 
55 
56 exorbitant  prices  in  2000  -  the  company’s  Chairman  defended  the  scheme  on  the 
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1 
2 
3 grounds that ‘giveaway programs are best for protecting patents. “In the whole nature 
4 
5 of philanthropy, we feel this increases shareholder value [and] helps us dramatically 
6 
7 
with our regulators and with our legislators”’ (Gellman,   2000). 
8 
9 
10 Many access programmes have come as a direct response to NGO campaigns 
11 
12 and  the  often  associated  threat  of  compulsory  licensing  by  developing    countries’ 
13 
14 governments  (Trullen  &  Stevenson,  2006).  Keck  and  Sikkink  refer  to  this  as   the 
15 
16 ‘mobilisation  of  shame’  (2007:  537)  -  the  ability  of   civil  society  campaigns      to 
17 
18 
influence   companies’   behaviour   through   (the   threat   of)   reputational      damage. 
20 
21 According  to  a  PR  consultant  for  several  major  companies:  ‘The  industry  is  very 
22 
23 scared  of  arguing  over  this  because  of  the  experience  in  South  Africa’  and   most 
24 
25 companies tend  to  ‘respond  immediately,  even  a  bit irrationally…to  whoever shouts 
26 
27 
the loudest’. But the South African court case was exceptional - unique in fact in the 
28 
29 
30 history  of  the  AIDS  pandemic  -  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  negative  publicity    it 
31 
32 generated (Morin,  2011; Owen, 2013).  When  PR  practitioners were probed  about the 
33 
34 industry’s  actually  existing  political  communication  efforts  it  clearly  emerged  that 
35 
36 mass publics are virtually excluded from everyday   consideration. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Obviously,  a company’s  reputation is important  to it.  But…the  general public 
42 
43 is  way down there at the  bottom.  In terms of the publics  we’re     interested in, 
44 
45 it’s the prescriber, the doctor, it’s the patient who’s taking our drugs, it’s the 
46 
47 
regulatory and health care policy-making bodies, it’s the politicians, and it’s 
48 
49 
50 the  shareholder.  And  that’s  where  the  vast  majority  of  our  PR  efforts   are 
51 
52 directed. 
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1 
2 
3 By and  large,  then,  media  visibility of  CSR programmes,  while certainly  welcomed 
4 
5 by companies’ PR  departments,  is not  paramount.  Here  it is important to recall     that 
6 
7 
pharmaceutical   companies’   business   is   first   and   foremost   with   state-run health 
8 
9 
10 systems  not  individual  consumers.  The  industry’s  main  objective  concerning global 
11 
12 policy,  according to  another senior lobbyist,  is therefore ‘to  be well-perceived by  the 
13 
14 public health people and the limited number that you may interact with in Geneva or 
15 
16 in New  York’  rather than extolling the  industry’s  virtuous  conduct in poor   countries 
17 
18 
to  mass  audiences.  As  the  A2M  crisis  escalated  in  the  early  2000s,  the    industry 
20 
21 worked  primarily  outside  the  media  sphere,  communicating  its  CSR  activities  and 
22 
23 charitable donations directly to decision makers. To mention but one example, ‘on the 
24 
25 eve  of  the [June  2002] G8  Summit  in  Kananaskis,  the [IFPMA]  sent  a  letter to the 
26 
27 
heads  of  government,  detailing  its  members’  50-plus partnerships  with international 
28 
29 
30 organisations and aid bodies around the world’ (Cowlett,   2002). 
31 
32 In sum,  the  strategic  communication of  CSR constitutes an important element 
33 
34 of   the   industry’s  political  communication  strategy  geared  towards  restoring    elite 
35 
36 consensus around the existing TRIPS-based medical innovation model by portraying 
37 
38 
major  pharmaceutical  corporations  as  capable  of  meeting  the  health  needs  of   the 
40 
41 global poor without undue state intervention (such as compulsory   licensing). 
42 
43 
44 
45 Lobbying  and manufacturing support 
46 
47 
In  parallel  to  CSR,  the  industry  has  also  engaged  in   extensive  inside      lobbying 
48 
49 
50 activities in  order  to  limit  the  political  and  regulatory repercussions from the   A2M 
51 
52 campaign  and  established  links  with  civil  society  organisations  in  various  sites  of 
53 
54 power.   Both   EFPIA  and   IFPMA  hired   APCO,   a   leading  public  affairs agency, 
55 
56 following  the   ‘bruising  legal   battle   in  South  Africa’  (APCO,   n.d.),   while     the 
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1 
2 
3 Association  of   the   British   Pharmaceutical   Industry  hired   a   subsidiary  of Weber 
4 
5 Shandwick, another giant of the global PR industry, to conduct its EU public affairs 
6 
7 
work on access to medicines in developing countries (Allen, 2003). APCO presents    its 
8 
9 
10 work for the IFPMA as one of its ‘client success’ stories, touting its ‘ability to work at 
11 
12 senior  levels  of  the  international  policy  community  and  influence  policy outcomes 
13 
14 [which] led to a successful defense’ of the TRIPS agreement at the Doha conference 
15 
16 (APCO,   n.d.).  APCO  implemented  a  multipronged  strategy:  ‘Anticipating     the 
17 
18 
strategies   of   the   key   players   in   the   debate…Marshalling   a   set   of compelling 
20 
21 arguments   which…would  make  revision  of  the  agreement  unnecessary,   or     even 
22 
23 undesirable’ and then,  in line  with the  abovementioned media  strategy,    ‘Identifying 
24 
25 the  most  influential  policy-makers  [and]  a  broader  audience  of  key opinion-leaders 
26 
27 
who  would  help  shape  the  debate  on  HIV/AIDS,  poverty  and  development’, while 
28 
29 
30 communicating  its  clients’  willingness  ‘to  help  address  the  healthcare      challenge 
31 
32 facing   developing   countries’.   The   exact   details   of   APCO’s   campaign    remain 
33 
34 unknown,  given  the  tendency of  such  promotional actors  to  work  behind  a  veil  of 
35 
36 confidentiality (Aronczyk, 2015).  And while  APCO arguably inflates its influence   on 
37 
38 
policy  outcomes,  its  approach  is  indicative  of  the  industry’s  emphasis  on targeting 
40 
41 ‘priority audiences’ rather than mass publics in its attempt to avoid the ‘disastrous 
42 
43 prospect’ of a weakening of WTO TRIPS rules (APCO,   n.d.). 
44 
45 Similarly, at the EU level, EFPIA’s main objective was to restore an image of 
46 
47 
‘a respectable  and respected and responsible  industry’  vis-à-vis policy-makers.  It  has 
48 
49 
50 done  so,  in  part,  through  direct  lobbying  and  organising  various  events  to   which 
51 
52 ‘people from the Commission and some MEPs were invited.’ Even   though 
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1 
2 
3 the  media  were  not  always  reporting  on  it…through  these  conferences   we 
4 
5 were  able   to  show   good  will  and  good  faith…These  moments  of     direct 
6 
7 
confrontation,  one-on-one  meetings  or  conferences  were…helpful  to  project 
8 
9 
10 an  image  of  an  industry  which…is  not  like  the  tobacco  industry,  which  is 
11 
12 really an evil per se. 
13 
14 
15 
16 Another  important  promotional  strategy  to  defuse  regulatory  threats  and    maintain 
17 
18 
access   to   policy-makers   has   been   to   establish   partnerships   with   civil   society 
20 
21 organisations  -  a  common  legitimating  strategy  used  by  corporations     (Aronczyk, 
22 
23 2015) - in line with PR Week magazine’s advice to ‘look to…the likes of Shell, and 
24 
25 embrace  the  support  of  NGOs  and  other  third  parties.  The  image  of  the  big,  bad 
26 
27 
pharma giants would then seem all too far fetched’ (Cowlett, 2002). Some companies 
28 
29 
30 have  championed  direct  engagement  with  A2M groups, partly  in  an  attempt  to pre- 
31 
32 empt negative publicity. In the case of BI, for example, ‘the relationship has much 
33 
34 improved’ in recent years. ‘We have a number of contacts every year with the most 
35 
36 important NGOs…So they will contact us before they go to the press,’ a strategy that 
37 
38 
‘keeps us out of the  media’. 
40 
41 More  commonly,  companies  have  established  links  with  other  NGOs     and 
42 
43 patient   groups   in   particular   (Ecks,   2008;   Koivusalo  &   Mackintosh,   2011). An 
44 
45 industry-NGO  alliance  ‘gives  you’,  one  lobbyist  noted,  ‘a  badge  of  credibility’  in 
46 
47 
policy-making circles. The latter also became a core  part of EFPIA’s    communications 
48 
49 
50 strategy, which ‘moved more from a PR activity, bombarding with press releases’ in 
51 
52 the  early  2000s  ‘to  an  engaging  strategy  with  third  parties,  with  patients  in     the 
53 
54 middle’.  The  practice  of  enlisting third-party support  to  legitimate industry demands 
55 
56 has a long history at the EU level (CEO, 1998) and, according to one Member of the 
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1 
2 
3 European  Parliament  (MEP),  ‘for  a  long time  it appeared like  a  genuine  grassroots 
4 
5 patients  movement.  Of  course,  it  turned  out  that  pharmaceutical  companies    were 
6 
7 
financing it. Not a big shock, but they hid it very well’. And although major patient 
8 
9 
10 organisations in Brussels have not directly lobbied on the issues of medicines access 
11 
12 in  the  Global  South,  as  another  MEP  pointed  out:  ‘If   you  establish  links       with 
13 
14 politicians via patients organisations, those links are still there when you debate other 
15 
16 things’. 
17 
18 
Finally, the industry’s political communication efforts need to be situated in 
20 
21 the  context  of  the  highly  uneven  distribution  of  ‘communication  power’  (Castells, 
22 
23 2009) in the EU policy sphere between different interest groups involved in the A2M 
24 
25 debate (Dür & de Bièvre, 2007).  The  pharmaceutical industry spends a  declared    €40 
26 
27 
million  per year on  lobbying in  Brussels,  some  fifteen  times more than  public health 
28 
29 
30 NGOs (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2015), ‘with EFPIA making    itself 
31 
32 indispensable  to  the  Commission  through  three  or  four  experts  on   pharmaceutical 
33 
34 regulation’     (Adamini et al.,  2009:  994).  At the EU level, the  A2M controversy thus 
35 
36 unfolds   against   the   background   of   what   a   seasoned   EFPIA   lobbyist   calls  an 
37 
38 
‘underlying recognition’ in the EU policy sphere that a strong intellectual property 
40 
41 rights  regime  is  essential  for  maintaining  the  EU’s  global  competitiveness: ‘at that 
42 
43 level there is alignment but that goes beyond’ medicines, ranging from ‘software’ to 
44 
45 ‘Parma ham’. 
46 
47 
This alignment  is not a given  nor  did  it arise spontaneously.  It is,  at least    in 
48 
49 
50 part, the product of the concerted communicative agency of the pharmaceutical lobby 
51 
52 (and its strategic allies in the software, chemical, and media industries) in Brussels 
53 
54 and  other  sites  of  power that is  being continuously adapted  to shifting political    and 
55 
56 economic    circumstances,    including   opposition   from    civil    society   (Drahos   & 
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1 
2 
3 Braithwaite, 2002; Pugatch, 2004; Roemer-Mahler, 2013). Crucially, the media have 
4 
5 only played a subsidiary role in the corporate campaign to sustain this alignment in 
6 
7 
response to  the A2M controversy.
12  
Other,  less visible communicative platforms    that 
8 
9 
10 only rarely attract attention from mainstream news media play a far more important 
11 
12 role  in mediating relations  between policy elites, setting the  bounds of policy   debate, 
13 
14 and cementing elite consensus around TRIPS. Consider, for instance, the theme of a 
15 
16 2011   conference   organised   by   the   European   Centre   For   International  Political 
17 
18 
Economy,  an  influential  Brussels-based  think-tank,  attended  by  industry   lobbyists, 
20 
21 senior  Commission  officials  and  European  trade  ministers:  Trade  and   Intellectual 
22 
23 Property Rights: A Narrative and Agenda for  Europe.13 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Conclusion: The limits of media  power 
28 
29 
30 The  global  campaign  for  access  to  AIDS  medicines  confronted  the  world’s largest 
31 
32 pharmaceutical corporations with a public relations crisis with potentially    far-reaching 
33 
34 political and economic implications. In an attempt to shed new light on the industry’s 
35 
36 response,   the  analysis  has   shown   that  while   it  has  occasionally  demonstrated   a 
37 
38 
capacity  to  mobilise  influential  news  publications  to  target  elite  audiences,        the 
40 
41 industry  has  focused  its  resources  on  communicative  channels  and  activities    that 
42 
43 largely  circumvent  mediated  public  arenas  –  from  strategically  communicating   its 
44 
45 CSR activities, enlisting support from civil society organisations, to direct   lobbying. 
46 
47 
The case study reviewed here raises a number of theoretical issues    concerning 
48 
49 
50 the   relationship  between  media,   communication  and  political  power.  Firstly,    the 
51 
52 findings challenge the prevalent view that ‘the same interest groups that dominate the 
53 
54 inside game of politics can often be expected to be predominant in the outsider arena 
55 
56 of the media’ (Bernhagen & Trani 2012: 51). For whereas the industry effectively lost 
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1 
2 
3 the  ‘media  battle’ in the aftermath  of  the  South African  court case, in  the  EU policy 
4 
5 sphere   power   relations   are   reversed:   the   A2M   advocacy   network   finds   itself 
6 
7 
continuously reacting to a trade agenda in which the right to health of the global poor, 
8 
9 
10 though acknowledged, is subsidiary to the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical 
11 
12 industry  (Dür &  de  Bièvre,  2007).  Of  course,  this  does  not mean  that  the industry 
13 
14 always  gets  its  way.  Nonetheless,  expanding  the  existing  TRIPS  regime  remains a 
15 
16 central trade objective  of  the  EU (as  well as the US),  both of  which have  in    recent 
17 
18 
years pursued various ‘TRIPS-plus’ agreements with emerging economies    that extend 
20 
21 the market exclusivity (and thereby the price) of patented medicines (Sell,   2011). 
22 
23 Secondly,   the   findings   indicate   that   there   are   important   limits   to    the 
24 
25 assumption that ‘politics is essentially played out in the media’ (Castells, 2009: 194) 
26 
27 
and,  subsequently,  that  the  capacity of  competing interest  groups  to  generate media 
28 
29 
30 visibility  is  paramount  for  affecting  policy  change.  This  certainly  holds  for  many 
31 
32 areas  of  public  policy  but,  as the  industry’s  response  to  the  A2M campaign shows, 
33 
34 ‘power  is  exercised  not  just  through  the  mass  media  but  outside  and    sometimes 
35 
36 despite  the  media’  (Miller,  2010:  121).  Indeed,  ‘strategic  communication is equally 
37 
38 
about  strategic absences of  communication’ (Aronczyk,  2015: 2020) as some  interest 
40 
41 groups  may  have  little  to  gain  from  generating  media  attention for  their respective 
42 
43 policy positions or agendas. This may seem obvious to some observers - as it was to 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
lobbying strategies by European interest groups, Tresch and Fisher (2015: 358) note 
that business associations tend to ‘benefit from privileged access to   policymakers’, 
have a ‘general preference for inside lobbying’, and thus do not seek out media 
exposure to exercise power. Similarly, De Bruycker and Beyers (2015: 458) highlight 
that ‘too much public visibility may backfire’ and, when defending the policy status 
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1 
2 
3 quo, ‘especially the powerful avoid media coverage’ (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2015: 
4 
5 458). But this point is often lost on media and communication scholars, particularly in 
6 
7 
contemporary  debates  about   the   ‘mediatisation  of   politics’   (Strömbäck   & Esser, 
8 
9 
10 2014),  when  the  media  arena  is  seen  as  the  primary  locus  of  political     struggles 
11 
12 between competing social  actors. 
13 
14 Critical communication scholars should thus pay close attention to messages 
15 
16 which are, intentionally or not, not mass-mediated, the ‘policy silences’ (Freedman, 
17 
18 
2010),  and the ideological and  communicative  processes  whereby alternative    policy 
20 
21 paradigms   are   foreclosed,   despite   the   obvious   methodological   challenges    this 
22 
23 approach may pose. Particularly regarding processes of transnational governance,    this 
24 
25 indicates the importance of interdisciplinary research which combines analysis of    how 
26 
27 
political struggles play out in the media sphere with investigations of the ensemble of 
28 
29 
30 inside  lobbying  techniques  and  private  communication  channels  whereby  powerful 
31 
32 social actors seek to influence outcomes in concrete policy areas (Beyers, 2004; Philo 
33 
34 et al., 2015). The focus here has been mainly on the industry’s CSR activities; the 
35 
36 strategic  mobilisation of think-tanks,  for example, is  another area  that requires   much 
37 
38 
careful empirical scrutiny. In this context, attention should turn to Aronczyk’s (2015: 
40 
41 2012) ‘transnational promotional class’ – the  ‘lobbyists,  consultants, public     relations 
42 
43 practitioners,   and   marketers’   -   who   occupy   an  increasingly   central   position in 
44 
45 contemporary political communication  generally and in  advancing corporate   interests 
46 
47 
more specifically (Miller & Dinan,  2008). 
48 
49 
50 To   conclude,   a   move   beyond   a   media-centric   conception   of     political 
51 
52 communication seems all  the more  pertinent in the  realm  of  global health and    trade 
53 
54 governance  given  that  policy  actors  inhabiting  key  sites  of  power  operate   almost 
55 
56 wholly outside mass-mediated public spheres. Mainstream news media signally fail    to 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 report   about  the  content,   and   often   the   very   existence,   of  policies  adopted  by 
4 
5 institutions  such  as  the  WHO  and  the   WTO  that  have  far-reaching  social       and 
6 
7 
economic  consequences. Barring occasional  leaks, international trade  negotiations are 
8 
9 
10 typically   conducted   in  secret.   This   creates  a   communicative   milieu   that allows 
11 
12 powerful actors like the pharmaceutical industry to entrench the terms of public    policy 
13 
14 that, as the campaign for access to affordable HIV drugs has shown, are subsequently 
15 
16 extremely difficult to undo even when they are brought into the media    spotlight. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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22 
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37 
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39 
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1 
2 
3 Appendix A - List of  interviewees 
4 
5 Boris  Azaïs  -  Director  of  European  Government  Affairs,  Merck  Sharpe  & Dohme, 
6 
7 
February 2011. 
8 
9 
10 Brendan  Barnes  -  Director  of  Multilateral  Issues  and   Health  Policy,        European 
11 
12 Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, December   2010. 
13 
14 Sarah Boseley - Health Editor of the Guardian, December   2010. 
15 
16 David Cronin - former correspondent for European Voice, November   2010. 
17 
18 
Christophe  de  Callatay  -  former  Communications  Director,  European  Federation of 
20 
21 Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (2000-2008),  May  2012. 
22 
23 David  Earnshaw  -  Chief  Executive  Officer  at  Burson  Marsteller  Bruxelles; former 
24 
25 Head  of  Office  at  Oxfam  International  Brussels  (2001-2002);  former  Director    of 
26 
27 
European  Government  Affairs  and  Public  Policy  at  SmithKline  Beecham     (1996- 
28 
29 
30 2001), April 2011. 
31 
32 Judith von Gordon - Head of Media and PR at Boehringer Ingelheim, February    2011. 
33 
34 Patrice  Grand  -  Head of  International  Public  Affairs,  Bristol-Myers Squibb,  20 July 
35 
36 2010. 
37 
38 
Andrew Jenner -  Director Innovation,  Intellectual Property and Trade  at  International 
40 
41 Federation  of  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers &  Associations; former Head  of   Trade 
42 
43 and Development at UK Intellectual Property Office, September   2011. 
44 
45 David Martin – Member of European Parliament, April   2011. 
46 
47 
Jon Pender - Vice-President,  Government Affairs, Global Access,  IP and     HIV/AIDS 
48 
49 
50 Issues,  GlaxoSmithKline,  December 2010. 
51 
52 Michael Rabbow - HIV Policy and Public Affairs, Boehringer Ingelheim, April   2011. 
53 
54 Carl Schlyter – Member of European Parliament, November   2010. 
55 
56 
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